| Ranasinghe S Joseph |

Earlier this year, Bangladesh became the first South Asian country to join the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. At first glance, this milestone seemed like a win-win: Bangladesh would gain legal and international support to safeguard its waterways, while the region might see a boost in cross-border water cooperation. But, as highlighted in Pintu Kumar Mahla’s article in The Conversation, the reality is far more complex and potentially fraught with tension.

For Bangladesh, water is not merely a resource; it is a lifeline. Half the population lives in areas prone to severe drought, while floods inundate up to a quarter of the country’s land each year. More than 65 million people still lack access to safe sanitation. Climate change and population growth only deepen these pressures, and many rivers that once nourished the land are vanishing. In this context, joining the UN Water Convention is not just a diplomatic gesture—it is a survival strategy.

Yet Bangladesh’s rivers are almost entirely transboundary, flowing through India and China before reaching its delta. This makes the country uniquely vulnerable to the decisions of its neighbors. Mahla points to several flashpoints: the looming Motuo Hydropower Station in Tibet, India’s ambitious river-linking schemes, and disputes over the Teesta and Barak rivers. For Bangladesh, international legal frameworks offer leverage in negotiations that have long been fraught with tension.

India, however, sees things differently. The 1996 Ganges Treaty guarantees a specific water share for each country, and India fears that Bangladesh’s UN Convention membership could shift the balance of power. Proposed institutional reforms to manage 14 transboundary rivers, seen by Dhaka as a path toward fairness, are viewed in New Delhi with suspicion. If Bangladesh secures more water, it could strain India’s already water-stressed eastern regions, particularly during dry seasons.

The implications extend beyond bilateral relations. Mahla notes that Bangladesh’s accession could set a precedent for other countries in the region, including Nepal and Bhutan. Meanwhile, Dhaka’s announcement of trilateral cooperation with China and Pakistan adds another layer of strategic complexity, hinting at new alliances in a region long defined by historical rivalries.

What emerges from Mahla’s analysis is a stark truth: water is both a lifeline and a source of tension. Bangladesh’s accession to the UN Water Convention illustrates the delicate interplay of environmental necessity, social survival and geopolitical strategy. For India, the choice is clear yet difficult: cling to bilateral control or adapt to emerging multilateral norms that could reshape regional power and security. For Bangladesh, the risk of alienating a powerful neighbor may be justified by the urgent need to protect its people and its rivers.

In South Asia, water has always been political, but in an era of climate change, rising populations and vanishing rivers, it has become existential. Bangladesh’s bold step onto the international stage is a reminder that survival often demands diplomacy and, sometimes, calculated risk.

Ranasinghe S Joseph is a Sri Lankan American expert on South Asian affairs.